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WINNING THE PEACE? AN EXAMINATION INTO BUILDING AN AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) AND NEW IRAQI ARMY (NIA)
Our strategy in Iraq has three objectives -destroying the terrorists -enlisting the support of other nations for a free Iraq -and helping Iraqis assume responsibility for their own defense and their own future.
President George Bush
Our shared goal is to help the Afghan people rebuild a politically stable, economically viable, secure Afghanistan.
Colin Powell
Since 2001, the United States has placed the global war on terrorism and removal of threats of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. at the forefront of our National Security Strategy (NSS). During the past two years the military element of power has been the most prominent element of national power being used to achieve our NSS. In October 2001 the U.S. theaters in order to achieve national strategic victories. In order to achieve strategic victories the U.S. and its coalition partners must establish and maintain secure and stable environments to create the conditions necessary for the emergence of democratic governments. In both theaters our ability to create secure and stable conditions for the interim governments of Afghanistan and
Iraq is more difficult than anticipated. As Americans are exposed to daily news reports of American and coalition force casualties, the pressure builds on the Bush administration to expedite stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in order to transfer responsibility to the Afghan and Iraqi governments, thereby eliminating the requirement for continued long-term presence of U.S. and coalition forces in both theaters.
There are several writings on post-conflict reconstruction based on recent U.S.
experiences that identify essential tasks towards post-conflict reconstruction. John Hamre and Gordon Sullivan identify four distinct and interrelated categories of post-reconstruction tasks, or "pillars": security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well being, and governance and participation. 1 Of the four, Hamre and Sullivan state that security is most critical because …"security encompasses collective as well as individual security and is the precondition for achieving successful outcomes of the other pillars." 2 This is reinforced by Lakhdar Brahimi, formerly a Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Afghanistan and now working in a similar role in Iraq, when he said "a number of parallel efforts must come together, including the creation of a new Afghan army and police along with the demobilization of existing forces, constitutional reform, initial preparations for elections, and the implementation of large-scale reconstruction and local development projects." 3 Likewise, Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill list security, in their "Mission Matrix", for Iraqi reconstruction as not only the essential first task but as a task that will remain essential throughout the entire period of reconstruction of Iraq. Since the end of major combat operations in both theaters the task of creating secure and stable environments for other post-reconstruction efforts remains the essential task. Until emerging security gaps are eliminated, U.S. and coalition forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq will remain for years to come. These forces are necessary not only to counter security threats but to fulfill the role of national defense forces that are virtually nonexistent in both countries.
The United States is fully engaged in the major chore of nation-building in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Success of the nation-building process hinges on the U.S. ability to diminish and eliminate security gaps in both countries. This is a task of considerable significance and difficulty when one considers the current security threats that include armed warlord forces in Afghanistan and insurgents in Iraq. In both cases the U.S. has put reconstruction efforts and long-term stability of these two countries at risk by failing to address the gap between security needs and security resources. In Afghanistan, reconstruction efforts are in daily jeopardy due to the absence of sufficient security forces outside of Kabul to address the existence of the warlords, production and exportation of drugs, and the influx of returning Afghan refugees. Not to mention the Taliban and Al Qaida remnants. In Iraq, members of the Interim Governing Council are at risk, as well as Coalition soldiers and many Iraqis, as insurgents continuously hamper progress. History shows that in modern state-building an army is a necessary part of the security solution. Therefore, the development of new credible defense forces is a necessary and appropriate step that the U.S. has failed to comprehend. While the goal in both cases is to create professional security institutions that will provide for the individual and collective security of Afghans and Iraqis alike, the magnitude of the challenges to accomplish this goal was underestimated. The challenges are many and include ethnic and tribal diversity; recruitment and retention issues; Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR); the presence of spoilers; and acceptance by the people as legitimate armed forces. The focus of this paper is on these challenges in the development of new national military forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Until these forces achieve operational capability both the Afghani and Iraqi the interim governments are entirely dependent upon U.S.-led coalitions and their limited and hastily trained indigenous police forces to provided the required level of security to mitigate the existing security gap.
In Afghanistan, the development of a national defense force includes the building of an Afghan National Army (ANA) to shape both the current and future environment. Given an appreciation of past military norms it will take more than a well-developed plan to ensure the dramatic changes needed to develop professional armies. The second part of this paper addresses the complexity of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) as it applies in both situations. The last part of the paper will look at the ability of the Bush administration to apply the appropriate means to the timely development of credible defense forces. Having established the objective of building new legitimate military forces is one thing, having the means to achieve the desired end-state is another.
THE ANA AND NIA IN RELATION TO HISTORY AND NATIONAL CHARACTER
Afghanistan and Iraq offer two very distinct histories that should not be overlooked as the U.S. and coalition forces define the ANA's and NIA's mission, roles, structure, and civil-military
relationship. It appears that a good deal of thought has gone into ensuring that the history and culture of these two nations are influencing factors on how the new militaries are constructed.
Since the 1890s, Afghanistan had established regular armed forces that where employed as a mechanism of state-building. The army, which started out at 15,000, went through several modernization efforts that were limited during Afghanistan's civil war. After the civil war modernization efforts included the opening of a military academy, schools for cavalry, artillery and infantry. By 1936 the army numbered 60,000 and played an important role in internal security. After World War II the army was 90,000 strong but still deficient of good equipment.
During 1950-1978, the Afghan government utilized Soviet assistance to professionalize its army.
A by-product of Soviet influence in Afghanistan was U.S. efforts to undermine the Soviets by providing military aid to the mujahidin. The Afghan-Soviet war and ensuing civil war led to support and growth of numerous warlords and their militias and the demise of a central or singular Afghan military force. Hence the country was carved up among numerous armed factions with many mujahidin commanders establishing themselves as local warlords and creating regional forces loyal only to the regional warlord, thereby establishing a society of armed actors. It is this brief history lesson that illustrates the complexity of the ANA's role in placating the natural tensions in Afghanistan between the competing power bases throughout Afghanistan. As one author noted "Afghanistan's tumultuous political history has resulted in a recurring lack of consistent, legitimate central authorities able to create or sustain a reasonably disciplined, loyal armed force. The fluid nature of alliances, the loose bands of fighters prone to hate crimes when a battle is looming or not going their way, and the tendency to desert and then re-join when the bounty or weather is favorable are difficult obstacles to creating an effective regular fighting force." 8 The desired outcome is to develop the ANA as a non-partisan army that recognizes only the authority of the legitimate government and a non-partisan army that the people recognize as legitimate institution of the Afghan government. This may sound logical but it does force one to ask the question--is it a realistic option when considering the realities of Afghanistan's past and present culture, which is best characterized by internal strife?
This is just one of the questions that the Karzai government must answer if it really envisions the ANA "as a connecting body  uniting Afghans in a cause larger than tribal concerns or linguistic associations." The ANA and NIA have inherited tainted and draconian legacies they will have to struggle with for some time to come. Arguably more significant is the threat of instability sustained by the militias in Afghanistan and insurgents in Iraq continue to threaten the existence of the new armies. It is paramount that, in both efforts, the differences between their old and new militaries are clearly delineated, understood, and demonstrated openly to the people of Afghanistan and it is even more apparent that these new armies must be developed with a greater sense of urgency to offset the security gaps.
TOWARD NEW NATIONAL ARMIES
The formation of the ANA and NIA evolved along two very similar paths although both emerged from two entirely different sets of circumstances. In Afghanistan there is a wide security gap among the regions (between Kabul and the regions, and between Kabul and bordering states) while in Iraq the security gap is primarily a result of an insurgency. The ANA has been given an essentially non-military, law enforcement-style mission in the short-term plan, while functioning as a fully-fledged military force is its long-term stated objective. 13 The NIA's mission in the short-term is to assist Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) in stability operations and in the long-term possess a full professional defense capability. 14 Inherent in either approach is the desire for each military to achieve three specific goals:
• To serve as an unifying symbol of nationalism
• To possess professional soldiers expected of modern militaries
• To establish good relationships with the people
The most difficult and sought after goal is the emergence of the two militaries as symbols of nationalism. President Karzai chose the Afghan National Army name for he said "it will be a national army, and the term "national" signifies the need to establish an army that is representative of all Afghan people." 15 The ANA is envisioned by the Karzai government and others to serve as a unifying influence that will assist in overcoming significant internal centrifugal forces such as "deep ethnic, linguistic, secretarian, tribal, racial and regional cleavages and Qawm identity, emphasizing the local over higher-order formations. required changes that the ANA and NIA must make from the onset to become the professional military force desired. 28 Each of the required changes is significant and will require constant attention and resolve in order to take hold over time.
Equally daunting is the need to build good relationships with the people. Recruiting stations are a great start but the relationship must be built on the basis of mutual respect and trust. It is imperative that both armies are given numerous opportunities early on to outwardly assist the people in missions other than war and fighting. This could be accomplished by supporting humanitarian activities throughout the country. The size and type of military organizations interacting with the people is not important. What is important is the symbolic display of how ethnic and tribal diversity are not impediments, but enablers. Frequent public displays of professional, well disciplined and compassionate forces may help win the people's hearts and minds. • DDR shall be impartial, paying due consideration to the diversity of Afghan society
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION
• A phased approached will be adopted
• Disarmament should be completed within one year
• The Afghanistan's New Beginnings Program (ANBP) will be established to implement demobilization and reintegration
It is believed by some that the "guns to plow" program will only succeed if there is active involvement of an international armed force, significant economic incentive, and an understanding of the current Afghan militia structures. 33 Expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been a consistent request of President Karzai and has finally begun but will take some time to develop. Until then the emphasis needs to be on the development and maturity of the ANA. Unfortunately at the time of phased implementation of ANBP in the fall of 2003, ISAF was still limited and the ANA was not ready in terms of size to take on this mission. Some have been bolstered by the ANA's successful deployments alongside U.S. soldiers in order to provide security in the absence of trained local police forces. 34 More problematic is the fact that the military is still perceived as an instrument of Fahim and his regional forces (Shura-yi Nazar) in spite of reforms that were taken prior to ANBP (phased) implementation. This perception could destabilize efforts to ensure equal application of demobilization among the warlords. The optimistic assessment is that the ANA coupled with trained local police forces are enough to ensure the success of DDR only if economic incentives are sufficient and equal as to not cause a conflict among the militias.
The Karzai government has established economic incentives through the ANBP. The program establishes a payment of $200 in Afghan currency, food staples (130 kilograms) and counseling and training for a new career in exchange for a weapon (it has been said that many combatants possess more than one weapon). 35 The new employment areas include reintegration of the ex-combatant into rural life, vocational training, assistance in establishing small businesses, de-mining employment, assistance in establishing agribusinesses, and wage laborers. 36 These economic incentives have to be followed through carefully or the process will collapse as soldiers return to their former activities. One activity of concern is the Afghan warlords', and their soldiers, involvement in heroin production and trade. Afghanistan is expected to yield 75% of the world's heroin in 2004, achieving an income equal to half of its GDP. The alarming statistic presented by a Western anti-narcotics expert in Kabul is the estimation that approximately 60% of the regional warlords are profiting from drug trafficking and using the profit to support their regional armies. 37 William Durch emphasizes this point by stating "This is a significant challenge to the DDR process because opium supports not only organized crime but local faction leaders' resistance to the development of legitimate central authority." 38 Understanding the current militia structures and how to dismantle existing power pyramids appears well thought out and cautiously approached as the DDR was initiated using small pilot projects and then expanded into larger regions. 39 The pilot projects began in Kondoz and then moved to Bamiyan and Gardez. These areas were selected first based on their political climate.
ANBP implementation will then carry through Mazar-i Sharif and Parwan. 40 without a license as long as they did not take the weapon outside. 44 It is estimated over 50 major weapons depots in Iraq contain over 650,000 tons of weapons such as rifles, missiles, and ammunition. 45 Security is already a large concern in Iraq and the presence of the lightly secured depots makes them vulnerable, but nowhere does there appear to be urgency for the cache of weapons to be destroyed.
46
The current program to disarm combatants and noncombatants requires reevaluation.
Iraqis, like Afghans, have a long history of gun ownership and are not likely to hand over these weapons unless there is adequate incentive. As in the Afghan DDR process, the CPA needs to appreciate what is important to the Iraqis and concede to some of their desires. As one analyst recently offered, "instead of buy back programs, Iraqis would benefit from community based weapons collection programs. Rather than turning in weapons for cash, a neighborhood could receive increased security patrols; provision of electricity; or assistance with rebuilding schools, roads, and shops, for a target number of weapons turned in." 47 The process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is moving too slow in both countries. It has taken Afghanistan almost one year to begin its formal phased implementation of ANBP. The process was initially stalled due to the slow response of the MOD to put in place required reforms. Transferring military power from the locals to the ANA is going to remain a tough mission. In Iraq the CPA needs to ensure the current lawlessness does not result into formation of tribal warlords in rural areas, creating an Afghan effect. The primary difference between Afghanistan's and Iraq's DDR programs is that the Karzai government has some degree of legitimacy as it works ANBP because of the backing of the United Nations, Japan, and a myriad of Non-governmental agencies. In Iraq, neither the CPA nor Iraqi Governing
Council appears to have attained any level of legitimacy in this process, nor have they produced any formal plan to conduct DDR.
APPLICATION OF MEANS
Building new militaries comes at considerable cost. Resources in terms of the application of dollars towards manning, training, equipping, and sustaining must be available for the ANA and NIA to mature into credible forces. In both cases the current governments and economies are not in a position to provide the necessary means to build their armies. In both cases the reliance is on resources from international coalitions. In this regard it appears that the U.S. and coalition forces are putting forth considerable resources to shape the conditions for the acceptance and legitimacy of both emerging governments and military institutions. In terms of providing weapons, equipment, and ammunition the U.S. Congress supported President Bush's plan to spend $170 million to support the ANA and $2 billion to support the NIA. Reports indicate that it is not an absence of money and support that presents a challenge to the building of the armies but recruiting procedures themselves. The challenge for Afghanistan is to improve recruiting capabilities to overcome their primitive transportation and communication conditions, reduce desertion rates that in most cases are encouraged by warlords, and mitigate the tribal divisiveness of the MOD. 48 The challenge for Iraq is also high desertion rates. As the NIA prepared its first battalion to begin working with U.S. military units, more than one-third of its soldiers deserted. 49 The reason for these sudden desertions was a realization by the Iraqi soldiers that they received a salary of $70 per month while other Iraqi security forces salaries averaged $10 to $40 more per month. 50 Initial indication from the CMATT is that changes will be made in the pay scale to ensure soldier retention.
All of these indicators are outward demonstrations of the U.S. government and coalition partners commitment of resources to the ends of establishing new armies. Nonetheless, this commitment is not enough, and time is against both Afghanistan and Iraq. As William Durch points out, in Afghanistan current efforts focus on the long-term solutions while the immediate need is an acceleration of the ANA to assist during the next year of transition otherwise the U.S.
and others are wasting valuable resources. 51 The solution, according to Durch, is to accelerate the building of the ANA and deploy it into the major towns now while simultaneously expanding the International Security Assistance Force. These are both essential steps identified in 2002
that have yet to take place.
In Iraq, the U.S. learned that it did not have enough soldiers on the ground to secure the cities and suspected "hot spots" at the end of major combat operations. It was this miscalculation that facilitated the emergence and growth of an insurgency in Iraq. Currently, U.S. forces remain challenged in eliminating the insurgency. The administration exacerbated security gaps in Iraq by eliminating the pre-existing military forces in their entirety, introducing a policy that has resulted in the unemployment of over 700,000 Iraqis and created additional tension towards the CPA and any governmental or nongovernmental agency that supports U.S. Beyond 2004, it is critical that the financial support and international security presence remains to ensure the continued maturation of these armies and their economies to sustain them. So the greater question is, can the U.S. sustain its commitment to providing the resources needed towards the development of both of these armies, in terms of manpower, equipment, and dollars, as the current administration faces a presidential election year? The answer has to be yes, or both Afghanistan and Iraq will never achieve the security necessary to ensure that they do not become failed states.
CONCLUSION
Afghanistan and Iraq will continue to occupy a great deal of America's energy, soldiers, and money for some time. Only when true peace and stability is achieved will U.S. and coalition presence diminish. Until then, the Afghan and Iraqi interim governments need to aggressively pursue the growth and development of their new defense forces. Afghanistan and Iraq's new emerging governments have an incredible amount of work to do towards establishing their governing institutions. Among these is the very crucial establishment of formal civil-military relations. Joseph McMillan points to four priority tasks that he believes are "interrelated issues that lie at the political-military nexus between any constitutional government and the armed forces that serve it:
• How national security policy is determined through the political process?
• How the legitimate government exercises control over armed forces?
• How national resources -both human and financial -are allocated to military purposes? • How the military force reflects and interacts with society at large?" battalions is an important and critical step towards establishing their relationship with the people they are there to support. The public credibility of these new armies will be on the line as they begin executing missions at the lowest end of the spectrum, but it is a necessary risk. The U.S.
and coalition must make every effort to allow the ANA and NIA to demonstrate that their existence is to promote and preserve the quality of life that Afghan's and Iraqis desire. WORD COUNT=6778
